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ABSTRACT
Recent study of adversarial aacks has revealed the vulnerability
of modern deep learning models. at is, subtly craed perturba-
tions of the input can make a trained network with high accuracy
produce arbitrary incorrect predictions, while maintain impercep-
tible to human vision system. In this paper, we introduce Block
Switching (BS), a defense strategy against adversarial aacks based
on stochasticity. BS replaces a block of model layers with multiple
parallel channels, and the active channel is randomly assigned in
the run time hence unpredictable to the adversary. We show empir-
ically that BS leads to a more dispersed input gradient distribution
and superior defense eectiveness compared with other stochastic
defenses such as stochastic activation pruning (SAP). Compared to
other defenses, BS is also characterized by the following features: (i)
BS causes less test accuracy drop; (ii) BS is aack-independent and
(iii) BS is compatible with other defenses and can be used jointly
with others.
ACM Reference format:
Xiao Wang1∗, Siyue Wang2∗, Pin-Yu Chen3, Xue Lin2, and Peter Chin1. .
Block Switching: A Stochastic Approach for Deep Learning Security. In
Proceedings of AdvML’19: Workshop on Adversarial Learning Methods for
Machine Learning and Data Mining at KDD, Anchorage, Alaska, USA, August
5th, 2019, 5 pages.
DOI:
1 INTRODUCTION
Powered by rapid improvements of learning algorithms [11, 14, 16,
31, 32], computing platforms [1, 12], and hardware implementations
[10, 17], deep neural networks become the workhorse of more and
more real world applications, many of which are security critical,
such as self driving cars [3] and image recognition [11, 14, 22, 28, 30],
where malfunctions of these deep learning models lead to serious
loss.
However, the vulnerability of deep neural networks against ad-
versarial aacks is discovered by Szegedy et al. [24], who shows
that in the context of classication, malicious perturbations can
be craed and added to the input, leading to arbitrary erroneous
predictions of the target neural network. While the perturbations
can be small in size and scale or even invisible to human eyes.
is phenomenon triggered wide interests of researchers, and a
large number of aacking methods have been developed. Some typ-
ical aack methods include Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) by
Goodfellow et al. [8], Jacobian-based Saliency Map Aack (JSMA)
by Papernot et al. [20], and CW aack by Carlini and Wagner [5].
ese aacks utilize gradients of a specic object function with
respect to the input, and design perturbations accordingly in order
is work is supported by the Air Force Research Laboratory FA8750-18-2-0058.
to have a desired output of the network. Among the aacks, CW
aack is known to be the strongest and oen used as a benchmark
for evaluating model robustness.
In the meantime, a rich body of defending methods have been
developed, aempting to improve model robustness in dierent as-
pects. Popular directions include adversarial training [18], detection
[9, 19], inputs rectifying [6, 29], and stochastic defense [7, 25–27].
However, although these defenses alleviate the vulnerability of
deep learning in some extent, they are either shown to be invalid
against counter-measures of the adversary [4] or require additional
resources or sacrices. A signicant trade-o of these methods is
between defense eectiveness and test accuracy, where a stronger
defense is oen achieved at the cost of worse performance on clean
examples[27].
Motivated by designing defense method with less harm on test
accuracy, in this article we introduce Block Switching (BS) as an
eective stochastic defense strategy against adversarial aacks.
BS involves assembling a switching block consisting of a number
of parallel channels. Since the active channel in the run time is
random, it prevents the adversary from exploiting the weakness of
a xed model structure. On the other hand, with proper training,
the BS model is capable of adapting the switch of active channels,
and maintains high accuracy on clean examples. As a result, BS
achieves drastic model variation, and thus have strong resistance
against adversary without noticeable drop in legitimate accuracy.
e nature of BS also enables its usage jointly with other type of
defenses such as adversarial training.
Our experimental results show that a BS model with 5 channels
can reduce the fooling ratio (the percentage of generated adversarial
examples that successfully fool the target model) of CW aack from
100% to 21.0% on MNIST dataset and to 22.2% on CIFAR-10 dataset
respectively with very minor testing accuracy loss on legitimate
inputs. As comparison, another recent stochastic defense stochastic
activation pruning (SAP) only reduces the fooling ratio to 32.1%
and 93.3% given the same aack. e fooling ratio can be further
deceased with more parallel channels.
e rest of this article is organized in the following way: In Sec-
tion 2, we introduce related works in both aacking and defending
sides. e defense strategy and analysis are given in Section 3. Ex-
perimental results are given in Section 4. And Section 5 concludes
this work.
2 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
FGSM. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [8] utilizes the gradient
of the loss function to determine the direction to modify the pixels.
ey are designed to be fast, rather than optimal.
Specically, Adversarial examples are generated as following:
x ′ = x − ϵ · sign(∇(lossF ,t (x))) (1)
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where ϵ is the magnitude of the added distortion, t is the target
label. Since it only performs a single step of gradient descent, it is
a typical example of “one-shot” aack.
CW. Carlini & Wagner (CW) aack [5] generates adversarial ex-
amples by solving the following optimization problem:
minimize D(δ ) + c · f (x + δ )
subject to x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n (2)
where c > 0 controls the relative importance between the distortion
term D and loss term f . e loss term f takes the following form:
f (x + δ ) = max( max{Z (x + δ )i : i , t} − Z (x + δ )t ,−κ) (3)
where κ controls the condence in aacks.
3 METHOD
3.1 Block Switching Implementation
Training a Block Switching model involves two phases. In the
rst phase, a number of sub-models with the same architecture
are trained individually from random weights initialization. With
the training process and data being the same, these models tend
to have similar characteristics in terms of classication accuracy
and robustness, yet dierent model parameters due to random
initialization and stochasticity in the training process.
Aer the rst round of training, each sub-model is split into
two parts. e lower parts are grouped together and form the
parallel channels of the switching block, while the upper parts are
discarded. e switching block is then connected to a randomly
initialized common upper model as shown in Fig. 1. In the run time,
a random channel is selected to be active that processes the input
while all other channel remains inactive, resulting in a stochastic
model that has dierent behavior at dierent time.
e whole BS model is then trained for the second round on the
same training dataset in order to regain classication accuracy. In
this phase, the common upper model is forced to adapt inputs given
by dierent channels so that a legitimate example can be correctly
classied given whichever channel is active. Usually, this phase
is much faster than the rst round of training since the parallel
channels are already trained.
3.2 Defense Analysis
Let Y = F˜ (x) denoted the learned mapping of a stochastic model.
Note that F˜ is a stochastic function and now Y is a random variable.
e defending against adversarial aacks can be revealed in two
aspects.
• Stochasticity of Inference: Since Y = F˜ (x) is a random vari-
able, an adversarial example that fools an instance F 1 of the
stochastic model F˜ sampled at t1 may not be able to F 2 sampled
at t2.
• Stochasticity of Gradient Due to the stochasticity of the net-
work, the gradient of aacker’s objective loss with respect to the
input is also stochastic. at is, the gradient backpropagated to
the input is just an instance sampled from the gradient distribu-
tion. And this instance may not represent the most promising
gradient descent direction.
Note that these two aspects are actually correlated. From the
aacker’s point of view, the goal is to nd arg max
x
E[A(F˜ (x),T )]
Figure 1: e steps of assembling a block switching. (a):
Sub-models are trained individually. (b): e lower parts of
sub-models are used to initialize parallel channels of block
switching.
where A(·) outputs 1 if the aack is successful and 0 otherwise,
and T is the target class. erefore, the aacker is beneted from
using stochastic gradients other than gradients from a xed model
instance, in order to generate adversarial examples that are robust
to model variation. In another word, this means the adversary
cannot benet from simply disabling the variation of the stochastic
model and cra perturbations using a xed model instance.
e above analysis holds for any stochastic model but the ques-
tion is what makes a good randomizatin strategy against adversarial
aacks? Intuitively, a good randomization strategy should cause
the input gradients to have wider distributions. In an extreme case,
if the gradient direction is uniformly distributed, performing gra-
dient descent is no beer than random walking, which means the
aacker cannot take any advantage from the target model.
Knowing this, we explain why block switching performs bet-
ter than existing stochastic strategies such as SAP. In Fig. 2 we
visualize gradient distributions under CW aacks to a SAP model
and a BS model respectively. We observe that the gradient (of the
aacker’s object function w.r.t the input) distribution of the SAP
model is unimodal and concentrated While the gradient of BS has
a multimodal distribution in a wider range. is distribution indi-
cates that it is harder to aack BS than SAP which is veried by
our experiment results in Section 4.
Usually dramatic variations of the stochastic model tend to harm
classication accuracy on clean inputs. at is why in SAP, smaller
activation outputs have more chance to be dropped. e reason
that Block Switching maintain high test accuracy despite drastic
model change is that, since each channel connected to the common
upper model is able function independently. As long as the common
2
Figure 2: We use three images (a-c): Gradient distributions
of CW attack on a SAP model. (d-f): Corresponding gradi-
ent distributions on a block switching. Distributions in the
same column belong to the same input dimension. Each dis-
tribution is sampled for 100 times.
upper model can learn to adapt dierent knowledge representations
given by dierent channels, the stochastic model will not suer
from signicant test accuracy loss.
An interesting question that readers may ask is: why stochas-
ticity of the model does not impede the second round of training?
e fact is that although the gradients with respect to the input
are random variables, the gradients with respect to model parame-
ters are not. Since gradients of the inactive channel are just zeros,
only weights parameters in the activate channel will be updated
in each training step. erefore, although the weights to be up-
dated alternates, the gradients with respect to model parameters
are deterministic at any time.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we compare the defense eectiveness of regular, SAP
and BS models against FGSM [8] and CW [2] aacks on MNIST [15]
and CIFAR-10 [13] datasets. FGSM is a typical “one-shot” method
which performs only one gradient descent step and CW aack is
known to be the strongest aack method so far [2].
Both of these two datasets contain separated training and test-
ing sets. In our experiments, the training sets are used to train
the defending models and the testing sets are used to evaluate
classication performance and generate adversarial examples.
is section is organized in the following way: Details about the
defending models, including the models’ architectures and training
methods, are given in Section 4.1. Defending records against FGSM
and CW aacks are shown in Section 4.2. Study on how the number
of channels in the block switching inuences its the defending
eectiveness and classication accuracy is provided in Section 4.3.
4.1 Model Details
4.1.1 Regular Models. We use two standard Convolutional Neu-
ral Networks (CNNs) architectures for MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets
respectively, as they serve as baseline models repeatedly in previous
works [21]. Both of these two CNNs have 4 convolutional layers, 2
pooling layers and 2 fully-connected layers but the kernel size of
convolution lters and layer width are dierent.
Both models are trained using stochastic gradient descent with
the mini batch size of 128. Dropout [23] is used as regularization
during training.
4.1.2 SAP. SAP can be applied post-hoc to a pre-trained model
[? ]. erefore, in order to make the experimental results more
comparable, we use the same trained weights for SAP model as of
the regular model. Stochastic activation pruning is added between
the rst and second fully-connected layers.
4.1.3 Block Switching. e switching block in this experiment
consists of 5 channels. During the rst round of training, 5 regular
models are trained as described above. Each regular model is split
into a lower part, containing all convolutional layers and the rst
fully-connected layer, and a upper part, containing the second
fully-connected layer. e lower parts of regular model are kept,
providing parallel channels of block switching while the upper parts
are discarded. A upper model, which is the same as the upper part
of regular models except that its weights are randomly initialized,
is added on top of all channels. e whole block switching is then
trained on original training set for the second time. We found that
the second round of training is much faster than the rst round.
On MNIST dataset block switching is retrained for 1 epoch and on
CIFAR-10 dataset 5 epochs.
Table 1: Testing Accuracy of dierent models onMNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets.
Model Test Acc. on MNIST Test Acc. on CIFAR
Regular 99.04% 78.31 %
SAP 99.02% 78.28 %
Sub-models Avg. 99.02% 78.97%
Switching 98.95% 78.73%
e test classication accuracy of all models is summarized in
Table 1. e direct comparisons are between the regular model and
the SAP model, since they share the same weights; and the average
of sub-models used to construct block switching and block switch-
ing itself. We can conclude that both SAP and block switching are
excellent in maintaining testing accuracy.
4.2 Defense against Adversarial Attacks
We use the fooling ratio, which is the percentage of adversarial
examples generated by a aack method that successfully fools a
neural network model to predict the target label, to evaluate the
defense eectiveness of the target model. e lower the fooling
ratio is, the stronger the model is in defending adversarial aacks.
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We also record the average L2 norm of the generated adversarial
examples from legitimate input images, since it is only fair to com-
pare two aacks at similar distortion levels. For aacks like CW
aack that uses a leveraged object function between distortion and
misclassication, a large distortion also indicates that it is hard for
the aacking algorithm to nd an adversarial example in a small
region.
4.2.1 Experiments on MNIST Dataset. For the sake of repro-
ducibility of our experiments, we report the hyper-parameter set-
tings we use for FGSM and CW aacks. FGSM has one hyper-
parameter, the aacking strength ϵ as shown in equation 1. When
using ϵ = 0.1, the L2 norm of adversarial examples roughly matches
CW, but the fooling ratio is way too small. us we also test the
case when ϵ = 0.25 in order to provide a more meaningful compar-
ison, although the L2 norm is signicantly larger. For CW aack,
gradient descent is performed for 100 iterations with step size of
0.1. e number of binary searching iterations for c in 2 is set to 10.
We use FGSM and CW aacks to generate adversarial examples
targeting the regular model, the SAP model and block switching
respectively. Experimental results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Fooling ratio (FR) and distortion of FGSM and CW
attacks with dierent target models on MNIST dataset.
Aack Regular SAP SwitchingFR L2 FR L2 FR L2
FGSM ϵ = 0.1 3.9% 2.73 3.7% 2.73 1.6% 2.73
FGSM ϵ = 0.25 34.0% 6.84 32.8% 6.84 20.3% 6.84
CW 100.0% 2.28 32.1% 2.28 21.0% 2.37
Although the SAP model demonstrates its extra robustness against
both FGSM and CW than the regular model, block switching is ap-
parently superior and deceases the fooling ratio further.
4.2.2 Experiments on CIFAR-10 Dataset. We use ϵ = 0.01 for
FGSM in this experiment in order to have adversarial examples
with similar distortion level comparing to examples generated by
CW aack. e hyper-parameter seing for CW aack is the same
as above.
Experimental results on CIFAR-10 datasets are shown in Table 3.
And block switching signicantly decreases fooling ratio of FGSM
and CW to 8.1% and 22.2% respectively while the SAP model only
shows minor advantages over the regular model.
Table 3: Fooling ratio (FR) and distortion of FGSM and C&W
attacks with dierent target models on CIFAR-10 dataset.
Aack Regular SAP SwitchingFR L2 FR L2 FR L2
FGSM ϵ = 0.01 25.0% 0.55 24.8% 0.55 8.1% 0.55
CW 100.0% 0.54 93.3% 0.52 22.2% 0.69
4.3 the Eect of Channel Number
To provide an analysis on how the number of channels in a block
switching aect its defense eectiveness as well as testing accuracy,
Figure 3: antifying the impact of channel numbers: we
plot defending eectiveness in terms of fooling ratio and
L2 distortion, and testing classication accuracy of block
switchings with 1 channel to 9 channels.
we run CW aack on BS models with dierent number of channels
ranging from 1 (which is a regular model) to 9.
In Fig. 3 we plot the fooling ratio, distortion and test accuracy
over dierent channel numbers: in general, the defense becomes
stronger with more channels of block switching and the fooling
ratio is lowest, 12.1%, when using 9 channels. e fooling ratio
drops rapidly from 1 channel to 4 channels while the drop of fooling
ratio decelerates aer 5 channels, which indicates the eectiveness
provided by switching channels starts to saturate. e increasing
of distortion of adversarial examples also indicates that BS with
more channels are stronger when defending adversarial aacks.
e trend of testing accuracy, on the other hand, is almost at with
a very slight descent from 78.31% to 78.17%. is indicates that BS
is very eective in defending adversarial aacks with very minor
classication accuracy loss.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate block switching as a defense against
adversarial perturbations. We provide analysis on how the switch-
ing scheme defends adversarial aacks as well as empirical results
showing that a block switching model can decease the fooling ratio
of CW aack from 100% to 12.1% . We also illustrate that stronger
defense can be achieved by using more channels at the cost of slight
classication accuracy drop.
Block switching is easy to implement which does not require
additional training data nor information about potential adversary.
Also, it has no extra computational complexity than a regular model
in the inference phase since only one channel is used at a time. In
practice, the parallel channels can be stored distributedly with
periodical updating, which can provide extra protection of the
model that prevents important model information leak.
More importantly, BS demonstrates that it is possible to enhance
model variation yet maintain test accuracy at the same time. And
we hope this paper can inspire more works toward this direction.
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